

Секция «Политические конфликты в современном мире»

What kinds of regime come after the overthrow of autocratic leaders and why?

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Section I: Introduction

- Identification of topic, identification of problem, development of research question

In November 2013, Viktor Yanukovich, the President of Ukraine at that time, decided not to sign a political association and free trade agreement with the European Union at Vilnius Summit. This gave the rise to the protests and peaceful rallies that eventually became violent after the government decided to suppress them[1]. They accused Viktor Yanukovich of being autocratic ruler with the corrupted government. On February 18 2014, a violent clash between protesters and police erupted. According to BBC, in the next couple of days, Central Kyiv has seen the worst violence ever since the independence - at least 82 people were killed. The protesters were demanding the restoration of the 2004 form of the Ukrainian Constitution which was repealed after Viktor Yanukovich had become the president of the country in 2010. Given all that political turmoil, the president decided to sign the "Agreement on settlement of political crisis in Ukraine" that would implement constitutional reforms in the country. However, it did not pacify the protesters: they were able to seize control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the parliament, the president's administration quarters and the cabinet. On the next day, protesters took the control of the whole city; Ukrainian parliament voted in favor of impeachment of Viktor Yanukovich who was already in the eastern Ukraine and then fled to Russia.

Overall, according to the Maidan volunteer doctors, the total real number of people who died during the clashes is close to 780, including 300 people who disappeared. During the period of five days, from February 18 to February 23, protestors could overthrow an autocratic leader in a violent way, turning him from the President to fugitive.

Now the most interesting question is whether those protestors of so-called Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity who have now seized the power will be able to democratize the country. Can the specific scenario of overthrowing the autocratic leader potentially determine the final form of the regime - democracy, autocracy, and hybrid?

Overall, how can one predict whether exactly democracy, not hybrid or another autocratic regime, will emerge after the overthrow of another autocratic leadership? Taking into account the increasing number of revolutions during the last couple of decades, e.g. color revolutions in the Eurasian region, that seek to establish democracy as the final regime after the overthrow of autocratic leader, the above-state question has become of even greater importance.

In this paper, I aim to design a study that would answer the following research question: "What kinds of regime come after the overthrow of autocratic leaders and why?"

- Conceptualization and operationalization of terms

Before proceeding to the literature review, it is important to define and operationalize concepts that I will be using in the paper. The units of analysis are overthrow of regimes. The states under the study must have undergone the process of overthrowing of autocratic regime, through the critical mean of color revolution.

Therefore, the term **revolution** is very crucial in the paper. It is worth-nothing that the meaning of the term is very debatable. On the one hand, Jeff Goodwin, a famous American sociologist, in his eminent work *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991*, defines revolution as following: “any and all instances in which a state or a political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional and/or violent fashion”. On the other hand, another remarkable American scholar on revolutions and contentious movements, Jack Goldstone states that revolution is “an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine authorities.” (Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, 139-187)

Different understandings of “revolution”; underline the diversity in understanding different revolutions and their outcomes, an idea which is quite crucial to be remembered while reading the paper. I will go with the general notion of revolution which is “a forcible overthrow of a government or social order, in favor of a new system”.

During the last couple of decades, one may observe a new type of revolution which is the rather ambiguously named “**Color Revolutions**”. While the term itself was coined by worldwide mass media to describe various overthrows of autocratic leaders on Balkans and the Eurasian continent, it has been recently applied to many other cases around the world including uprisings in the Arab World, China, and Iran as well. Participants were usually engaged in civil disobedience, economic noncooperation, strikes and demonstrations to express protest against government which was seen as corrupted and authoritarian, and to promote democracy. For the sake of this paper, when I specifically refer to Color Revolutions, I will mean Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, Second Kyrgyz Revolution in 2010, Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014.

The necessity to define **Eurasia** here was raised as well. However, the greatest challenge associated with term is how to draw the boundaries and find out those countries that build up Eurasian region. The first group of scholars defines Eurasian Region only by five Central Asian Republics, while the second group includes all post-Soviet states, yet the third group includes Eastern European countries and even Western regions of China as well. For the purposes of this paper, I will use the term Eurasia to define a region which is composed of only Post-Soviet states - Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Due to the fact that this discussion will revolve around autocratic regimes, it is thus necessary to define what I mean by **autocracy** in the context of the paper. There are many definitions for this term, but I will follow the more general one which defines autocracy: “a system of government in which supreme power is concentrated in the hands of one person, whose decisions are subject to neither external legal restraints nor regularized mechanisms of popular control - except perhaps for the implicit threat of a coup d’etat or mass insurrection” (Autocracy: A Glossary of Political Economy Terms, Dr. Paul M. Johnson).

Another term to define is **democracy**. To make discussion easier, I will follow a very basic definition of democracy which is “a system of government in which all the people of a state or polity ... are involved in making decisions about its affairs, typically by voting to elect representatives to a parliament or similar assembly” (Oxford Dictionary).

Measuring the level of democracy using only one scale will itself lead to the bias - some countries may score higher on scale, while lower on the other scale because democracy means

different thing to different people.

Therefore, for the sake of reducing measurement error and obtaining better and more substantive picture of reality, I will employ the use of multiple sourced of data (triangulation) from Polity, Freedom House and Democracy Index of Economist Intelligence Unit.

Now when I touched the topic of measuring the level of democracy, it is important to define **hybrid regime** here set by Leonardo Morlino “hybrid regime is always a set of ambiguous institutions... failing to acquire one or more essential characteristics that would make it fully democratic or authoritarian” (Morlino 2008).

Finally, I will work with the following definition of **political violence** that goes as violence outside of state control that is politically motivated. I will measure the amount of violence through the rationale and methodology of “Magnitude of societal-systemic impact” on the scale of 1 (smallest) to 10 (greatest). Magnitude scores reflect multiple factors including direct and indirect deaths, injuries, population dislocation, infrastructure and environmental damage. I will collect information not only from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, because it can contain spurious information, but also from the reports of international agencies and commission on inquires, and domestic NGOs that were particularly notable during the process. Thus, I will use the triangulation to obtain a better, more substantive picture of reality. More details will be specified in the next part on “Methodology”.

- Section II: Literature Review

The surge of democracy around the world known that began with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and continued with the democratization of Latin American, East Asian and Eastern European countries has become known as the Third Wave of Democratization. The process of democratization and obstacles to it has spurred many debates. As a result, the existing literature tends to provide a wide variety of hypotheses as to why the overthrow of an autocratic regime results in different outcomes other than the establishment of a democratic regime. The *function* of my literature review is to show that despite the existent work offers many hypotheses, most of them have *weaknesses* and *limits*; on the other hand, some new promising hypotheses are not thoroughly investigated, and thus should call for more attention and investigation.

For the sake of convenience, I have divided my literature review into several distinct parts. At the beginning, the agency-related factors explaining democratization dynamics such as the balance of power and the domestic elites will be considered, and then followed by the discussion of the structural factors such as religion and geography.

Some authors emphasize the importance of transitional period (Friedman 1993, Karl 1990, O'Donnell, Schmitter 1986). They contend that democracy emerged as a result of transitional moments, in which the balance of power between supporters and opponents of the authoritarian regime was relatively equal, albeit uncertain, which would subsequently lead to negotiations. They believe that two things went wrong if democracy did not emerge after the overthrow of autocracy. Firstly, there was no balance of power between contending groups, one group had more power than the other one. Secondly, no negotiation or failed negotiation occurred among these various groups; instead they were openly rivaling for a say in the new government.

O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that, in order to build a democracy, selected set of actors have to take three critical actions, providing the balance of power among them. Firstly, uncertainty about the various actors' ultimate intentions is usually present after the collapse of the old regime. Therefore, it is crucial to limit the agenda of policy choice by not implementing both economic and political reforms simultaneously because they may include contested issues over which parties are likely to disagree, thus hardly coming to agreement. Secondly, share

proportionately in the distribution of benefits, so that there will be trade-off among parties. In this step, negotiations and compromises are very crucial for building up democracy. Negotiations will enable all competing sides to achieve relative gains, thus satisfying them to certain extent, so that no party will revolt and overthrow the new regime. Thirdly, restrict participation of radicals and masses in negotiations. The theory emphasizes the possibility that former oppressed masses will try to take complete control over former ruling classes and their property and establish "justice". This may lead to the violation of the second critical action to achieve democracy - share proportionately in the distribution of benefits. The scholars usually cite the example of French Revolution, where participation of radicals eventually led to the Reign of Terror (1793-1794).

Contrary to what the first group of scholars proposes, the second group of scholars who also places the emphasis on the balance of power challenges the conditions put forward by the first group (Hellman 1998, McFaul 2002). Michael McFaul argues that the first assumption - "limit the agenda of policy choice" which is based upon the belief that one should not take political and economic reforms at one time if a state wants to build a democratic regime is not quite accurate. In fact, he claims that this has no clear empirical evidence. Conversely, countries with fast economic transformation achieved the greatest success by consolidating democratic institutions. Secondly, McFaul believes that it is masses that were crucial to democratization in the Third Wave. Furthermore, McFaul argues that equal balance of power, a critical element to reach democracy for the first group of scholars, may result in the outcome where the opposing parties may fight until the end to impose one's will on the other. This, thus, may lead to weak democracy at best and rampant violence at worst e.g. Russia, Tajikistan. According to him, equal balance of power will lead not to democracy, but to partial democracy and partial dictatorship. Additionally, he states that in most cases there was no negotiation, but rather confrontation between supporters and opponents of the old regime, e.g. East Central Europe & Baltic. In conclusion, this group of scholars believes that democracy will emerge only in those countries where there is unequal distribution of power after the overthrow of autocratic regime, i.e. the most powerful party will determine the course of the new regime.

If the most powerful party (independent variable) is represented by democrats, they will establish the system of checks and balances where their party enjoys dominance. However, the same equation holds true if opponents of democracy represent the most powerful party. As a result, the country may shift toward a new form of autocracy. Thus, unequal distribution of power will produce the quickest and most stable transition. Examples where regime became stable after dominant party had emerged include some African Republics such as Zambia and Post-Soviet States such as Armenia, Georgia and the Central Asian Republics (McFaul 2002).

Taking into account different groups' aspirations, some scholars have recently started studying the amount of violence used in democratization process which supposedly have direct result on the regime-building after the overthrow of the old regime. They emphasize this specific transition scenario and give the crucial role to the violence during the transition to democracy. They measure violence as any incidence of conflict. So, according to them, establishment of democracy as a final form of government (dependent variable) depends on the presence or absence of violence during the process of overthrowing an autocratic leader (independent variable). They employ a popular method of difference-in-difference to establish causal relationship. They compare the index of civil liberty before and after violent or non-violent transition to democracy occurred. They claim that their findings suggest that if the transition is achieved by means of violence, people are likely to have less political freedom by almost 1 point index than if the transition was peaceful. They usually cite the examples of Ethiopia, Indonesia and Nicaragua which had little improvement towards democracy after having violent transitions

(Cervellati, Fortunato, Sunde 2014)

However, the problem associated with this method is that countries that they choose to analyze before transition not necessarily have the same index of civil liberty. As a result, there is a measurement error in estimating the exact extent to which people had acquired more or less civil liberty after violent or non-violent transition.

Compatibility of Islam with Democracy spurs even a greater number of questions. The features of Islam such as egalitarianism, utilitarianism, aversion to hierarchy are definitely compatible with Islam. However, there is no separation between religious and political community, a feature that is central to debates. As a result of this absence of separation, many scholars (Anderson 2004, Huntington 1996) claim that Islam is incompatible with democracy, citing that no Arab country is truly democratic. The theory argues that the likelihood the nascent regime will finally become democratic (dependent variable) depends on the religion of people (independent variable) and features of religion (intervening variables). Consequently, the reason that the overthrow of autocratic regimes across the Arab World in 2011 did not produce democratic outcome is due to the region's predominant adherence to Islam and its primary feature of no division between political and religious community.

This theory faces two challenges. If Islam is incompatible with democracy, why was it Middle Eastern countries that were one of the first to try liberal democracy in the 20th century? Arab liberalism began in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Libya in the second half of the 19th century and continued until the midst of 20th century until the military (independent variable) finally interfered to suppress it (Zakaria 2004). The other challenge is that scholars usually consider religion as a culture. However, religion is just one part of culture, not the entirety of a culture. The fact that democracy has failed in the Middle Eastern countries is not necessarily connected to Islam, but rather Arab culture which fears modernization and treats democracy as Western invention (Zakaria 2004). Additionally, if countries with Muslim majority are destined to have only autocratic regimes, why the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, with 99% Muslim Population, is persistently being ranked as democratic by related indexes of democracy?

The role of geography has been recently given much emphasis (Whitehead 1999). The dominant hypothesis is based upon the idea of the impact of geographical proximity to the West on democracy. According to this theory, neighboring countries can powerfully affect 1) the interstate distribution of democratization; 2) the scope of democracy within the states affected; and 3) the viability of the resulting democratic regimes. The East European countries are usually cited as an example. On the contrary, if the state is surrounded by other autocracies, it is less likely that the state will be able to build democratic regime, even after the overthrow of the old regime within its own state. In short, this theory argues that the likelihood the nascent regime will finally become democratic (dependent variable) depends on geographic neighbors (independent variable). However, if this is the case, then why does Cuba remain autocratic despite the fact that it is located close to the biggest proponent of democracy in the world - USA.

In conclusion, the existing literature provides numerous hypotheses on the question of why democracy might not be an outcome after the overthrow of autocratic regime. However, most of these hypotheses were derived from the cases of democratization from the Third Wave. Those equations may not necessarily hold true for the cases from what is sometimes called Fourth Wave of Democratization. The hypothesis on equal balance power has in fact worked in some countries, establishing democracy as a final form of government, while failed in some other, leading to hybrid regimes. Thus, despite a crucial role of balance of power, there are some other parts of equation. Almost all hypotheses have either drawbacks or limitations in implementation.

For instance, scholars usually consider religion as culture, thus the results might be misleading when they check the impact of religion on choosing the final form of government. They do not take into consideration that religion is just one part of culture and there are some other parts of culture that may have exhibit a greater role in determining the final form of the new regime. Another promising hypothesis that the violent transition to democracy will result in less civil liberties has not been much empirically investigated in the literature. (Cervellati, Fortunato, Sunde 2014)

What is more important is that most hypotheses were developed by observing democratization processes during the Third Wave period. As a result, this does not imply that they are universal and will hold true for the Post-Soviet countries that I will further look at.

- Section III: Proposed hypotheses, theoretical framework and rationale

As it was said above, there is a little theoretical and empirical investigation of the role of violence during overthrow of autocratic leaders. In fact, there is no single unified theoretical framework that would encompass different democratization scenarios with testable implications on the consequences different types of democratization (Cervellati, Fortunado and Sunde 2014)

In this research I want to test several following hypotheses in relation to what factors affect the build-up of final regime after overthrow of autocratic government.

The theoretical model that I will use is proposed by the group of scholars including Conley and Temimi (2001), Llavador and Oxoby (2005), Lizzeri and Persico (2004). According to this model, the build-up of the final regime after the overthrow of autocratic regime is based upon the path of democratization, i.e. if it was violent or non-violent.

First, I want to check the hypothesis that if the process of overthrowing autocratic leader was violent, then it is more likely that people will have less civil liberty and will end up in either autocratic or hybrid regime. Most of the works done in this field focuses on the democratization processes that occurred in the 20th century, particularly from the Third Wave (Gradstein 2006). As a result, there is some measurement error due to incompleteness. I will focus on the period of 1789 to 2014. I choose the French Revolution as my starting point because it is the first violent overthrow of autocratic leader and one of the most influential of all socio-political revolutions that marked the inception of the Modern Ages and finish with Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine.

Undoubtedly, the French Revolution (1789-1799) had democratic goals, however, it was very violent, and it ended up in the Reign Of Terror and subsequent autocracy of Napoleon. Another example is Romanian Revolution of 1989. It was extremely violent civil unrest in which an autocratic leader Nicolae Ceausescu was executed. Despite this, Romania was considered to have a hybrid regime for more than 7 years after the violent overthrow of the autocratic leader, and it is still being constantly criticized for receiving poor ratings from Transparency International.

However, if it is the case that non-violent overthrow of autocratic leader will result in the buildup of democratic regime, and that violent overthrow of autocratic leader will likely to result in hybrid regime or another autocratic form of government, then why did the Revolution of Roses in Georgia result in different outcome? The 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia was non-violent overthrow of autocratic president Eduard Shevardnadze for the sake of establishing democratic regime by public led by Mikheil Saakashvili who was then elected as the President of Georgia. Despite this, Georgia was constantly being ranked as having hybrid regime by the

related indexes of democracy.

The case of Georgia can be simply outlier or an exception to this general trend. That is what I want to find first. To test my first hypothesis, I will employ a time-series-cross-section (TSCS) quantitative method to explore the relationship between DV (and the final form of regime - democracy, autocracy, and hybrid) and IV (the level of violence). My rival hypothesis is that type of transition is not significant for the chance of building up of democracy.

Secondly, I want to check the role of the religious leaders as a variable that can affect the final form of the regime. I will particularly look at the role of religious leaders before the overthrow of an autocratic leader and after it. My central question that all other questions will be revolving around is the following: "What did religious leader say about the old and new regime". I will look at five cases of color revolutions: Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan in 2005, Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and Ukraine in 2014. My primary goal is to establish causation by means of case-study. For the purpose of an exhaustive testing, I decide to control for such variables as post-soviet legacy and corrupted government of the countries I am going to look at.

Even though I have already formulated my hypotheses, I am open to any change or even proposition of new hypotheses as the research process will go. To put it another way, I will rely on spiraling approach that combines both approaches "theory-before-research" and "research-before-theory".

Section IV: Methodology

As I have mentioned earlier already, one of the challenges that can create bias in my research is using any particular measurement-scale of democracy. The scales that are usually employed to measure the level of democracy in any particular country include Freedom in the World, Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy and Polity. Each of the scales has its own criteria for assigning specific number to say country X; as a result, the country X can get a high value on the scale A, while a lower value on the scale B.

Firstly, Freedom in the World is an annual report by Freedom House that measure level of 'democracy' in each of the country in the world on the criteria of degree of civil liberties and political rights. They assign each country a score on the scale from 1 (Free) to 7 (Not Free)

1

Countries enjoy a wide range of political rights, including free and fair elections. Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power, and the interests of minority groups are well represented in politics and government. People enjoy wide array of civil liberties, including freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They have an established and generally fair legal system that ensures the rule of law (including an independent judiciary), allow free economic activity, and tend to strive for equality of opportunity for everyone, including women and minority groups.

2

Countries and territories have slightly weaker political rights than those with a rating of 1 because of such factors as political corruption, limits on the functioning of political parties and opposition groups, and foreign or military influence on politics. People have slightly weaker civil liberties than those with a rating of 1 because of such factors as limits on media independence, restrictions on trade union activities, and discrimination against minority groups and women.

3-4-5

Countries moderately protect almost all political rights or strongly protect some political rights while neglecting others. The same factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to a greater extent at each successive rating. They moderately protect almost all civil liberties or strongly protect some civil liberties while neglecting others.

6

Countries have very restricted political rights. They are ruled by one-party or military dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. They may allow a few political rights, such as some representation or autonomy for minority groups, and a few are traditional monarchies that tolerate political discussion and accept public petitions. They have very restricted civil liberties. They strongly limit the rights of expression and association and frequently hold political prisoners. They may allow a few civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and some open and free private discussion.

7

Countries have few or no political rights because of severe government oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war. They may also lack an authoritative and functioning central government and suffer from extreme violence or rule by regional warlords. Countries have few or no civil liberties. They allow virtually no freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of detainees and prisoners, and often control or dominate most economic activity.

Freedom House was persistently criticized for non-objectivity. The US Ambassador to Russian Federation, Michael McFaul once called it a type of biased American Agent that strives to influence every country in the world. Additional criticism includes on accuracy of the Freedom House - there is a gap between what the Freedom House reports and what people themselves report. In other words, those who produce reports generalize without referring to nationwide, systematic annual reports of NGOs and public activities.

Relying merely on the Freedom House can lead to the measurement error and subsequent inaccuracy in my results. On the other hand, a good researcher should not rely on the data that for surely will confirm his hypothesis - he should use alternative, multiple sources of data - *triangulation*.

Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy is another scale for measuring democracy in countries across the globe. Unlike Freedom House's report, it combines not only freedom of people and checks on government, but also electoral process, political participation and transparency. Based upon the above-mentioned categories, all countries around the globe are assigned one number, the description of which is similar to Freedom House's one.

0-3.9

Authoritarian Regimes

4.0-5.9

Hybrid Regimes

6.0-7.9

Flawed Democracies

8.0- 10.0

Full Democracies

Thirdly, Polity is third scale that will be used in my research. It is based upon the nature of elections (openness and competitiveness), nature of political participation and constraints on executive branch (checks and balances on government). They give a score for each country in the world:

-10 to -6

Authoritarian Regimes

-5 to 5

Hybrid Regimes

6 to 10

Democratic Regimes

Undoubtedly, each of the above scales is criticized for their criteria to be ‘misleadingly’ narrowed. It will be important to check how the rankings for countries differ in reality or not for addressing criticism. Particularly, my colleagues and I will compare Polity rankings to Economist’s and Polity’s to Freedom House. We would check if there is statistically significant difference between the rankings or not.

My null hypothesis states that there is NO statistically significant difference among the rankings.

Firstly, my colleagues and I will use the ‘F-test’ instead of ‘T test’; that can be potentially used as well because I am doing multiple comparisons, and the F ratio statistic will enable me to keep Type I error (rejecting the null hypothesis when we should have retained it) at a constant level. The level of my confidence interval will be 95%.

Secondly, if my findings will make me reject my null hypothesis, I will use a strong test of Tukey HSD to find out where statistical difference exactly lies. Otherwise, if I fail to reject my null hypothesis, I will not need to do the Tukey test.

While my colleagues are checking the statistical difference, I will run a non-parametric test of correlation to check the correlation between the form of regime - y (dependent variable) and violence - x (independent variable). For the simplicity at this stage, I will assign a dummy variable for violence - 0, if the violence was absent and 1 if the violence was present. For the x variable - I will assign 0 for authoritarian regime, 1 for hybrid and 2 for democratic regime. The test will enable me to check the correlation. The rival null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the presence of violence and the form of regime.

All statistical computations will be done R software for the following reasons. Firstly, I have much experience doing statistical computations in R. Secondly, it is free and can be easily accessed. Others may try to replicate our results without paying any fee. Thirdly, R is a powerful language - it means that I can analyze large data quickly and efficiently. Fourthly, it is excellent software to create graphics and scatterplots that I will include in my research paper for visualization, so that it will be easier for readers to follow my steps and interpret findings.

When the previous steps are done, and results are found, I will proceed to the decision making on my ‘x’ variable. If I reject my null hypothesis on statistical significance, and subsequently get Tuckey’s results to find where exactly the difference lies, I will use weighted average for those parts. Otherwise, if I retain my null hypothesis, I will proceed to building the model.

My regression model based upon will function to fulfill two primary objectives:

1. Indicate if independent variables have a significant relationship with a dependent variable.
2. Indicate the relative strength of different independent variables' effects on a dependent variable.

For obtaining more accurate results, I will need to my make my model more complex. Therefore, the dummy variable that I assigned for the absence/presence of political violence will be replaced, and each 'y' variable will receive a score based upon the following table.

1

Destructions are relatively low level; objectives are often diffuse and ill-defined and violent actions occur mainly as an expression of general dissatisfaction and/or social control. Oppositional violence is achieved mostly by small militant groups or confined to a very specific time, target, or location. Small population dislocations of short duration may occur from areas directly affected by violence

2

Destructions are limited. Objectives may be limited and clearly defined allowing warfare to remain confined or the general support for warfare and/or the nature of the opposition may be weak or resistant to provocation. Events are confined to short periods or specific areas of operation or may involve sporadic acts of terrorism over longer periods. Population dislocations of short duration may occur.

3

Destructions are limited; objectives are usually focused on strategic authority, including control of human and/or material resources. Long periods of relative quiescence may be punctuated by focused operations targeting armed factions, group leaders, or symbols of defiance. Population dislocations respond to specific, localized operations and may be counted up to the tens of thousands;

4

Destructions are moderate. Challenger groups' authority, discipline, and objectives are often diffuse and/or indistinct. Areas affected by warfare may be extensive but the intensity and the effects are limited, otherwise, violence is confined to distinct areas and/or periods of time. If armed conflict is protracted, long periods of dormancy will be punctuated by sporadic operations (re)establishing opposing group boundaries. Population dislocations may exceed tens of thousands in affected regions;

5

Destruction is at a high level but goals are limited and often ill-defined. Impetus to violence is often sustained by issue complexities that make negotiation and compromise difficult. Violence is intense but mostly confined to particular regions. Over twenty-five percent of societal production is consumed by the war effort. For some groups, local autonomy may be preferred over complete separation or predominance, allowing negotiated outcomes.

6

Destruction is high but limited; supplemental resources from external supporters are limited. Effects are persistent and development is arrested over the medium-term. Social mobilization is largely determined by the warfare event but crucial areas are fairly secure from attack. Over thirty percent of societal production is consumed by the war effort. Issues of contention are perceived as vital but terms are somewhat negotiable as neither war party has the capacity to

unilaterally impose and enforce a lasting settlement.

7

Destruction is extensive but resources and productive capacity are limited and, so, continuation of the struggle effort is often dependent on supplemental resources from external suppliers. Effects are persistent and development is arrested over the medium- to long-term. Social roles and mobilization are almost entirely determined by the culture of violence. No location within the society is secure from attack, including the largest cities. Core issues are considered non-negotiable.

8

Massive destruction of physical infrastructure with medium-term effects, non-combatants are not systematically targeted although great numbers are directly affected by violence. The adversary's military capabilities are the target for destruction; adversaries have become of comparable strength. Society and human capital are prioritized over military victory (capitulation or stalemate are possible).

9

Massive, mechanized destruction of human resources and physical infrastructure, with intentional targeting of both combatant and non-combatant societal factors resulting in widespread destruction and long-term effects. Whole societies are the target for destruction, that is, their capacity for both action and reaction; adversaries are of comparable strength and compromise is unacceptable.

10

Extensive, systematic, and indiscriminate destruction of human resources and/or physical infrastructure with persistent, adverse effects. The social identity itself is the target of destruction. Greatly disparate power and weapons' technologies and singularity of intent between adversarial groups make this category possible.

Thus, my first model will enable me to find out whether there is a relationship between the amount of violence and the type of regime as well as how strong the relationship is and whether it is statistically significant. Furthermore, I will be able to tell how one increment in the severity of political violence can affect the ranking of the country.

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